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The use of advertising activities to meet earnings benchmarks: 
Evidence from monthly data 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Using a unique and comprehensive data set of monthly information on advertising 
spending in media outlets, we examine whether managers engage in real earnings 
management to meet quarterly financial reporting benchmarks. We extend prior literature 
by: (1) examining quarterly as opposed to annual earnings benchmarks and separating 
advertising from other expenses, which allows us to incorporate advertising’s unique 
characteristics; (2) exploring the possibility that managers could either reduce or boost 
advertising to increase chances of meeting an earnings benchmark; (3) investigating the 
timing, within a fiscal quarter, of altered advertising spending; and (4) analyzing actual 
activities as opposed to inferring them from reported expenses, which could also be 
influenced by accrual choices. Our analysis suggests that managers reduce their 
advertising spending to achieve the financial reporting goals of avoiding losses, avoiding 
earnings decrease, and meeting analysts’ forecasts. We find some evidence that 
advertising spending increases during the third month of a fiscal quarter. This increase is 
stronger for managers who have incentives to meet earnings benchmarks and whose firms 
have higher margins. We find no evidence of an increased tendency to alter advertising 
spending after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  
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The use of advertising activities to meet earnings benchmarks: 
Evidence from monthly data 
 
1. Introduction 
Extensive evidence shows that managers engage in earnings management 
activities (for reviews of the evidence, see Healy and Wahlen [1999], Kothari [2001], and 
Fields, Lys, and Vincent [2001]). The literature to date identifies two main strategies to 
manage reported earnings: (i) accounting method changes and accrual-based earnings 
management that do not affect cash flows and (ii) real actions taken by managers that 
affect cash flows. The early evidence on earnings management concentrates on accrual-
based strategies. More recently, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal [2005], in a survey of top 
executives, report that 80% of respondents would decrease discretionary spending (such 
as research and development and advertising) to achieve financial reporting objectives. 
Consistent with the survey, large sample evidence suggests that managers engage in real 
earnings management to avoid reporting annual losses (Roychowdhury [2006]). These 
actions have implications for future firm performance (Gunny [2005]) and are viewed as 
substitutes to accrual-based strategies (Zang [2006]). 
While top executives recognize the importance of altering advertising activities as 
a means to achieve certain financial reporting objectives, large-scale empirical evidence 
to support this assertion does not exist. The literature to date has focused on other real 
activities, such as research and development, asset sales, and overproduction. Studies 
have only included advertising expenses (when they were available) as part of aggregate 
discretionary expenses. Given the economic importance of this item in a firm’s business 
strategy, we fill the void in the literature by analyzing it separately. 
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In this paper, we address the following research questions: (i) do managers use 
advertising activities to meet certain earnings benchmarks? (ii) are there circumstances in 
which managers will increase (rather than decrease) advertising activities to meet these 
benchmarks?, and (iii) is there a specific time during a fiscal period in which altering 
advertising activities to achieve financial reporting goals is more likely to occur?  
To answer these questions we employ a data set of monthly advertising activities, 
because these questions cannot be answered with data available on Compustat. Our study 
contributes to the literature on real earnings management by extending it along several 
dimensions. First, our high-frequency data on advertising enable us to focus on a specific 
item that is subject to managerial discretion in order to meet quarterly earnings 
benchmarks — the benchmarks that the extant literature on meeting financial reporting 
benchmarks has mostly investigated (DeGeorge, Patell, and Zeckhauser [1999], Brown 
and Caylor [2005]). Survey evidence in Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal [2005] also 
confirms that managers care about quarterly performance and benchmark beating. But 
because information on advertising expenses in Compustat is only available on an annual 
basis, analyzing managerial decisions about advertising expenses to meet quarterly 
benchmarks was not possible until now. 
In addition, prior studies generally aggregate the annual advertising expense 
together with other discretionary expenses such as research and development and 
maintenance, or as part of selling and general expenses. For example, Roychowdhury 
[2006] aggregates several items, such as R&D, SG&A, and advertising, into a single 
annual measure of discretionary expenses. Zang [2006] and Gunny [2005] separately 
analyze a finer set of annual variables that proxy for real earnings management, which 
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include abnormal levels of R&D, SG&A, production costs, and gains from asset sales. 
McNichols [2003] discusses the importance of disaggregating empirical measures of 
accounting choices in the context of accrual-based earnings management. Focusing on a 
single item provides a more powerful setting for the analysis and allows the exploration 
of richer theories about managerial actions that may vary depending on the item subject 
to discretion.  
Our second contribution is exploring the possibility that managers increase (and 
not decrease) their advertising activities to attain certain accounting benchmarks. Prior 
studies have assumed that reducing discretionary expenses (including advertising) 
directly maps into a contemporaneous increase in reported earnings. However, because 
reduced advertising can quickly lower revenues in some cases, it is not clear whether 
reducing advertising activities will always be beneficial to managers. The marketing 
literature suggests that there is a variation across firms and products in the lead-lag 
relation between advertising activities and sales (Assmus, Farley and Lehmann, 1984). 
That is, for some firms advertising activities may trigger an immediate response in sales, 
while for others, advertising will generate the desired impact after a longer period. This 
raises the possibility that in some cases managers may choose to increase advertising to 
increase sales and short-term earnings, rather than decrease advertising only to lower 
expenses. Thus, the relation between advertising and reported income may be ambiguous.  
Our comprehensive monthly data also allow us to study the timing of managerial 
choices regarding real activities, which is the third contribution of our study. This aspect, 
too, could not be achieved with existing large-scale data available through Compustat. 
Altering real activities, such as advertising, involves a tradeoff between two time 
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considerations. On the one hand, managers are interested in taking actions early in the 
fiscal period to ensure that their financial effects will be reflected by the time the fiscal 
period ends. In this way, the probability of achieving the desired financial reporting 
objective is increased. On the other hand, managers would like to postpone real actions as 
much as possible, to acquire more information about the firm’s expected financial 
performance for the period and about the magnitude of action needed to meet certain 
benchmarks. This learning minimizes the negative consequences of altering real 
activities. By examining high-frequency data, we are able to identify the month in which 
real earnings management may take place. 
Fourth, our data are extracted from direct observation of advertising activities in a 
wide range of media outlets. According to GAAP, these advertising activities are 
expensed as incurred. This enables us to directly examine managerial actions that have 
immediate financial statement consequences. In contrast, prior studies that examine real 
earnings management rely on income statement expenses. These expenses, however, 
could be affected by accrual choices. These studies implicitly assume a one-to-one 
correspondence between real actions and the observed accounting figures. However, this 
assumption may not necessarily hold, especially in samples of firms that have incentives 
to achieve certain financial reporting objectives. Thus, prior evidence is subject to the 
alternative explanation that accrual choices (for example, aggressive capitalizations) 
affect the level of expenses, rather than the real choices made by managers.  
Summary of the results. We find strong evidence that firms reduce their 
advertising spending in order to meet all three types of financial reporting objectives we 
examine — avoiding reporting a loss, meeting earnings from the same quarter in the 
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previous year, and meeting analysts’ forecasts or beating them by one cent. Utilizing the 
distinctive features of our high-frequency data, we find weaker evidence that there is an 
increase in abnormal advertising activities in the third month of a fiscal quarter. 
However, this increase is not limited to “suspect” firms, i.e., firms that have just met the 
three financial reporting objectives. One exception is that we do find evidence of 
increased advertising activities to meet analysts’ forecasts during the third month of the 
fiscal quarter.  
We find some circumstances in which firms have incentives to increase 
advertising spending to avoid reporting a loss. Specifically, firms with higher net margins 
are associated with higher abnormal advertising spending in the third month of the fiscal 
quarter. On the other hand, younger firms that are expected to have a shorter lead-lag 
period between advertising and sales do not increase their advertising. In fact, we find 
that older suspect firms are associated with higher abnormal advertising spending.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we survey the literature on real 
earnings management and develop our hypotheses. In section 3 we describe our research 
design. Section 4 describes our data. In section 5 we report the results. Section 6 
concludes.  
 
2. Hypotheses development 
2.1 Literature overview 
Accounting researchers have contemplated that managers manage earnings by 
cutting discretionary expenses to achieve certain earnings benchmarks such as (1) 
avoiding negative earnings, (2) avoiding earnings decreases and (3) meeting or beating 
analysts’ forecasts (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev [1997], Roychowdhury [2006]). Studies 
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have referred to such activities as “real” earnings management, which is different than 
accrual manipulations in that it generally has direct cash flow consequences. Graham, 
Harvey, and Rajgopal [2005, p. 32] find 
strong evidence that managers take real economic actions to maintain 
accounting appearances. In particular, 80% of survey participants report 
that they would decrease discretionary spending on R&D, advertising, 
and maintenance to meet an earnings target. More than half (55.3%) state 
that they would delay starting a new project to meet an earnings target, 
even if such a delay entailed a small sacrifice in value. . . .  
 
In surveys conducted by Bruns and Merchant [1990] and Graham, Harvey, and 
Rajgopal [2005], financial executives indicate a greater willingness to manage earnings 
through real activities than through accruals. There are at least two reasons for this 
preference. First, accrual-based earnings management is more likely to draw auditor or 
regulatory scrutiny than real decisions, such as those related to product pricing, 
production, and expenditures on research and development or advertising. Second, 
relying on accrual manipulation alone is risky. The realized shortfall between unmanaged 
earnings and the desired threshold can exceed the amount by which it is possible to 
manipulate accruals after the end of the fiscal period. If reported income falls below the 
threshold and all accrual-based strategies to meet it are exhausted, managers are left with 
no options because real activities cannot be adjusted at or after the end of the fiscal 
reporting period. 
Zang [2006] analyzes the tradeoffs between accrual manipulations and real 
earnings management. She suggests that decisions to manage earnings through “real” 
actions precede decisions to manage earnings through accruals. Her results show that real 
manipulation is positively correlated with the costs of accrual manipulation, and that 
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accrual and real manipulations are negatively correlated. These findings lead her to 
conclude that managers treat the two strategies as substitutes.  
Roychowdhury [2006] focuses on real activities manipulations, which he defines 
as management actions that deviate from normal business practices, undertaken with the 
primary objective to mislead certain stakeholders into believing that earnings benchmarks 
have been met in the normal course of operations. Focusing on the zero earnings 
threshold and examining annual data, he finds evidence consistent with firms trying to 
avoid reporting losses in three ways: (1) boosting sales through accelerating their timing 
and/or generating additional unsustainable sales through increased price discounts or 
more lenient credit terms; (2) overproducing and thereby allocating more overhead to 
inventory and less to cost of goods sold, which leads to lower cost of goods sold and 
increased operating margins; or (3) aggressively reducing aggregate discretionary 
expenses (defined as the sum of research and development, advertising, and SG&A 
expenses) to improve margins. This is most likely to occur when such expenses do not 
generate immediate revenues and income. 
In related research, Gunny [2005] examines the consequences of real earnings 
management and finds that real earnings management has a significant negative impact 
on future operating performance. Additionally, it appears that capital markets participants 
mostly recognize the future earnings implications of managers’ myopic behaviors.  
While the above papers have addressed important and relevant issues regarding 
the determinants and economic consequences of real earnings management activities, 
their analyses rely solely on annual data. In examining managerial incentives to meet or 
beat earnings thresholds, the extant literature emphasizes the importance of studying 
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quarterly benchmarks, especially in recent years (DeGeorge, Patell, and Zeckhauser 
[1999]; Brown and Caylor [2005]; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal [2005]). In particular, 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal [2005, p. 5] conclude that  
CFOs believe that earnings, not cash flows, are the key metric considered 
by outsiders. The two most important earnings benchmarks are quarterly 
earnings for the same quarter last year and the analyst consensus 
estimate. Meeting or exceeding benchmarks is very important. 
They also write (p. 21):  
Several performance benchmarks have been proposed in the literature. . . 
such as previous years’ or seasonally lagged quarterly earnings, loss 
avoidance, or analysts’ consensus estimates. The survey evidence. . .  
indicates that all four metrics are important: (i) same quarter last year 
(85.1% agree or strongly agree that this metric is important); (ii) analyst 
consensus estimate (73.5%); (iii) reporting a profit (65.2%); and (iv) 
previous quarter EPS (54.2%). 
One of our contributions is to examine real earnings management utilizing higher-
frequency monthly data on advertising expenses. This allows us to examine the relation 
between quarterly incentives and managerial behavior.  
2.2 The advertising context 
While existing evidence in the literature seems consistent with managers altering 
their operating decisions to achieve short-term earnings goals, there are at least two 
limitations to such an interpretation. First, it is not clear which types of discretionary 
expenses are subject to change and in which direction. For example, Roychowdhury 
[2006] pools all discretionary expenses together, by adding research and development, 
advertising, and SG&A expenses. However, the costs of manipulation of different 
activities may vary. For example, reducing (or increasing) advertising may differ from 
reducing R&D in terms of the feasibility of acting quickly to reduce capacity. Altering 
advertising is expected to be easier — and quicker to execute — than changing R&D, 
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because it does not require disposal of assets and/or laying off workers. Moreover, the 
implications on short-term earnings may differ by the type of activity, in terms of both 
direction and magnitude. We elaborate on this point in section 2.5. These scenarios 
cannot be empirically captured in studying aggregate measures of discretionary expenses. 
Therefore, we separately analyze advertising activities to capture the short-term 
implications on earnings and minimize the variation in manipulation costs across various 
expense items. 
The second limitation to interpreting the existing evidence as supportive of real 
earnings management is that it is based on reported expenses in the income statement. An 
analysis of expenses assumes a one-to-one mapping between advertising activities and 
their recorded expenses in the income statement. This may not necessarily hold if 
managers apply aggressive capitalizations to their advertising activities. As a result, this 
evidence is also consistent with accrual manipulation.1 In contrast, we examine the actual 
advertising activities that are observed in the marketplace using a database that tracks 
firms’ advertising at their source. According to GAAP, advertising activities have to be 
expensed as incurred, and therefore our database includes all media-related advertising 
that should have been expensed in the period in which they were aired or printed. (For a 
detailed description of the accounting treatment of advertising under GAAP, please see 
                                                 
1 For example, America Online has restated its results of operations in 1995 and 1996 to undo the 
capitalization of direct-response advertising. The effect on income was about $385 million. “The specific 
issue in the AOL case concerned an accounting rule adopted in 1995 that carved out a small exception from 
the rule that advertising and promotional costs must be expensed — that is, deducted from profits — when 
they are incurred. The exception, the SEC said, allowed the capitalization of direct-response advertising 
costs ‘only when persuasive historical evidence exists that allows the entity to reliably predict future net 
revenues that will be obtained as a result of the advertising.’ . . . America Online said it would restate its 
books to remove the $385 million write-off and instead apportion those costs during the earlier periods 
when they were incurred. There was no explanation from the SEC or the company as to why the settlement 
came so long after the facts were known. But it appeared that the company had resisted a settlement and 
gave in only after it became clear that the SEC would bring a case anyway” (“AOL pays a fine to settle a 
charge that it inflated profits,” The New York Times, May 16, 2000). 
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appendix A). As a result, we comment on actual real activities and not on the reported 
expenses, which could be a manifestation in financial statements of both real activities 
and accrual manipulations.  
The above discussion leads to our first hypothesis, which is stated in its null form: 
H1: Firms that are suspected to have managed earnings to achieve 
earnings benchmarks do not have abnormal advertising expenses that 
are different from firms that are not suspected to have managed 
earnings. 
 
2.3 Timing of advertising activities  
By using high-frequency monthly advertising data, we are able to examine the 
timing of decisions to alter discretionary expenses.2 When managing earnings through 
real activities, firms face a tradeoff between the costs of deviating from an optimal pre-
determined strategy for their advertising and the benefits of achieving an earnings target. 
To minimize the deviation costs, managers must have as much information as possible 
about the difference between current firm performance and the desired earnings 
benchmark. We argue that this information is more complete toward the end of a fiscal 
period, when there is better knowledge about expected pre-managed periodic 
performance. By waiting for a later point in the period, managers obtain more 
information about how much they need to alter their real activities. However, since real 
actions require some lag time to execute from the time a decision is made, managers 
cannot wait too long, or taking real actions will not be possible. Alternatively, managers 
                                                 
2 Zang [2006] argues that there is a pecking order in the tradeoff between earnings management through 
real activities versus through accrual decisions. Specifically, managers exhaust the options for real accrual 
management before resorting to earnings management through accruals. In contrast, in our analysis we 
study the timing of real activities, which may occur before any accrual decisions are made.  
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will pick the real actions that require the least amount of lag time for execution. 
Advertising activities require relatively shorter lag time between the decision and 
execution time, compared to, for example, research and development. Therefore, by 
analyzing advertising data, we are able to examine an activity that allows managers 
enough time to learn about current performance, and still provides ample time to react 
before the end of the quarter.  
It is important to pinpoint the time in the fiscal quarter in which real activities are 
altered. The alternative explanations for a general reduction (or boosting) of advertising 
expenses is that these changes are (1) a rational response by managers to (unobservable) 
changes in business conditions, and/or (2) a result of accrual management through end-
of-period capitalizations. Controlling for unobservable changes in business conditions is 
very difficult. Thus, if abnormal expenses are not a result of real earnings management, 
but rather a result of one or both of the alternative explanations, then we expect abnormal 
levels of advertising expenses to occur throughout the quarter, and not necessarily during 
the last month of the quarter. In that respect, our study enables us to distinguish more 
clearly between alternative explanations for results in prior literature, to the extent that 
these prior results are driven, at least partially, by advertising activities. This leads to our 
second hypothesis:  
H2: Firms that are suspected to have managed earnings to achieve 
earnings benchmarks will have abnormal advertising expenses 
(either positive or negative) during the last month of the quarter.  
 
2.4 The fourth fiscal quarter 
The accounting profession has been following an integral approach for interim 
reporting as mandated in APB Opinion No. 28 (APB [1973]), SFAS No. 3 (FASB 
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[1974]), and FASB Interpretation No. 18 (FASB [1977]). The underlying premise of this 
approach is that the fiscal year is the main reporting period, while the quarterly financial 
reports are integral parts of the annual reporting process.3 The standards underlying the 
integral approach require the reporting firms to estimate many of the annual operating 
expenses and then allocate these estimates to interim quarters. Managers can defer and 
accrue certain costs depending on their expectations about the operations of the business 
for the fiscal year as well as other reporting incentives. In contrast, quarterly sales 
revenues can be recognized on the same basis as for the entire fiscal year period.  
The principles of the integral approach will result in less precise interim estimates 
of cost accruals and deferrals in the first three fiscal quarters as compared to the fourth 
quarter. These cost estimates provide managers an opportunity to exert greater control 
over non-fourth quarter reported accounting figures relative to the level of fourth quarter 
earnings. Costs and expenses are estimated to a greater extent throughout the interim 
quarters compared to fiscal year-end, and in the interim quarters they are not necessarily 
audited by the firm’s independent auditors. In summary, it appears that the integral 
approach allows managers more discretion and estimation over inter-period costs than is 
available at the fiscal year-end, i.e., in the fourth quarter. 
The implementation of the integral approach coupled with the fourth quarter audit 
process suggests that the fourth fiscal quarter is different from the first three quarters. In 
our specific context, if managers indeed engage in both real and accrual earnings 
                                                 
3 APB No. 28, paragraph 9, states that “the Board concluded that each interim period should be viewed 
primarily as an integral part of an annual period.” The integral approach was preferred over a discrete 
alternative approach for interim reporting, under which each of the four quarters is viewed as a separate 
reporting period. This implies that accruals and deferrals under a discrete approach reflect the same 
principles used for annual reports by applying the same expense recognition principles to both interim and 
annual reports. Such an approach will result in no special interim accruals or any deferrals. 
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management activities, and do so sequentially (Zang [2006]), we expect that real 
activities will be reduced during the fourth quarter. However, if advertising activities 
represent an opportunity for real earnings management with a relatively short lag between 
decision and action, then managers may still resort to such activities in the fourth quarter. 
This is especially true because accrual management in the fourth quarter is more difficult 
as a result of increased auditor oversight. The above arguments lead us to our third 
hypothesis:  
 H3: Firms that are suspected to have managed earnings to achieve 
earnings benchmarks will have abnormal advertising expenses 
during the last quarter of the fiscal year.  
 
2.5 Advertising’s implications for reported earnings  
As mentioned before, prior studies aggregated advertising expenses along with 
other items. Such aggregate analysis of discretionary expenses implicitly assumes that 
cutting any one type of expense leads to a similar increase in short-term earnings. 
Consider a manager who has the option of reducing either R&D or advertising activities 
to achieve a benchmark. The effect on short-term earnings of altering advertising 
activities may be different than the effect of altering R&D. Moreover, managers who are 
interested in increasing short-term earnings may choose to either decrease or increase 
advertising. A reduction in advertising leads to an immediate reduction in operating 
expenses, and thus an increase in reported earnings for the concurrent period. For 
example, Netflix’s CFO said during the 2005 third-quarter conference call,  “we plan to 
cap our marketing spending just like we did in Q3 and meet our earnings guidance” 
(emphasis added).4 On the other hand, such reduction may quickly translate into a 
                                                 
4 See the full transcript at http://internet.seekingalpha.com/article/3995. 
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decrease in sales, which will reduce reported income. Thus, if the time lag between the 
occurrence of advertising and the reaction in sales is relatively short, managers may want 
to boost advertising to increase sales and, as a result, reported earnings, if margins are 
expected to be positive. For example, Blockbuster significantly increased its customer 
acquisition and marketing activities toward the end of the fourth quarter of 2006 to 
achieve the milestone target of two million subscribers to its online offering.5  
Whether managers will decrease or increase advertising activities to boost short-
term earnings depends on, among other things, the lag between advertising outlays and 
the response in sales. The marketing literature studies the relation between advertising 
and sales along two dimensions: (i) actual response of sales to advertising (advertising 
elasticity) and (ii) the lasting effect of advertising on future sales (the carryover effect).6 
This literature proposes several characteristics of firms and products that drive elasticity 
and carryover, because different products have distinct information needs and differences 
in product-market characteristics. This is important since we would expect firms with 
high advertising elasticity to increase advertising activities to meet earnings targets, while 
firms with low advertising elasticities would be more likely to cut advertising activities to 
meet earnings targets. Similarly, firms with high (low) advertising carryover will be more 
likely to decrease (increase) advertising activities to meet earnings targets.  
                                                 
5 “Blockbuster began offering free in-store rentals to subscribers of online rival Netflix Inc. on Tuesday as 
it tries to take market share from Netflix and reach its year-end subscriber goal. Netflix subscribers can get 
one free rental at Blockbuster stores for each address label they bring in from their Netflix mailing 
envelopes. The offer to Netflix subscribers, which runs until December 21, comes after Blockbuster began 
allowing subscribers to its own online rental service to swap DVDs they received in the mail at Blockbuster 
stores. The program, called Total Access, highlights the main difference between the two competitive 
services: Blockbuster has stores where consumers can immediately satisfy a desire for a particular movie. 
Blockbuster forecasted that it will add about 500,000 subscribers in the current quarter, to reach its year-
end goal of 2 million total subscribers” (FinancialWire, December 6, 2006).  
6 See Assmus, Farley, and Lehmann [1984] for a review of this literature. 
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Differences can be observed across product categories based on the stage of 
market development. For instance, elasticities should be higher during the early growth 
phase of a product market, when a significant number of new customers are added as 
adopters, than during the maturity phase of the product life-cycle, when most customers 
already have substantial experience with the product (Parsons [1975], Arora [1979], 
Winer [1979], Parker and Gatignon [1996]). Also, there are diminishing returns to 
advertising in that the first exposure of an advertisement is the most influential for short-
term sales or share gains (Deighton, Henderson, and Neslin [1994], Jones [1995], 
McDonald [1971]). Again, based on this, we would expect higher elasticities in the early 
stages of a product life-cycle.  
The empirical question is whether, on average, firms decrease or increase 
advertising activities to achieve certain earnings benchmarks. We use two variables to 
proxy for firms’ different approaches to increase reported earnings. First, we argue that 
firms with higher net margins are more likely to increase sales through increased 
advertising activities, because any increase in sales will translate into an increase in 
earnings, over and above the increase in advertising expenses. Second, we use firms’ age 
to proxy for the elasticity between advertising and sales. As argued in the marketing 
literature, younger firms will tend to have higher elasticity of advertising-to-sales than 
older firms. Therefore, any increase in advertising activities in younger firms will 
translate into larger increases in sales than in older firms. This leads us to our fourth 
hypothesis: 
H4: Firms that are suspected to have managed earnings to achieve 
earnings benchmarks are expected to decrease (increase) advertising 
activities if the expected benefit from reducing expenses is higher 
(lower) than the benefit from reduction in short-term sales. 
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2.6 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
Recent research has focused on evaluating and understanding the economic 
consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), arguably “the most far-reaching reforms 
of American business practices since the time of Franklin D. Roosevelt.”7 In particular, as 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal [2005, p.36] state:  
. . . the aftermath of accounting scandals at Enron and WorldCom and the 
certification requirements imposed by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act may have 
changed managers’ preferences for the mix between taking accounting 
versus real actions to manage earnings. 
 
Analyzing trends in earnings management practices in the pre- and post-SOX 
periods, Cohen, Dey, and Lys [2007] find that firms switched from accrual-based to real 
earnings management methods after the passage of SOX. They report that firms that just 
achieved important earnings benchmarks used fewer accruals and more real earnings 
management strategies after SOX when compared to similar firms before SOX. In a 
related study, Cohen, Dey, and Lys [2005] provide evidence that following the passage of 
SOX, managers became more risk-averse and decreased their investments as manifested 
in lower capital expenditures and R&D expenses. 
The apparent change in managerial behavior with respect to the alternative 
strategies employed to meet certain earnings benchmark after SOX motivates us to 
examine whether any such change can be observed in advertising decisions. In particular, 
we examine whether managers are more likely to alter advertising activities in the post-
SOX period. Thus, our fifth hypothesis is: 
H5: Cutting advertising expenses to meet earnings benchmarks is more 
likely to occur after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).  
 
                                                 
7 Elizabeth Bumiller, “Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations,” New York Times, July 31, 2002. 
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3. Research design 
In this section, we describe how we measure (i) the incentives to manage earnings 
and meet financial reporting benchmarks, and (ii) the abnormal advertising activity, 
which is the hypothesized real activity used by managers to achieve their financial 
reporting objectives.  
3.1 Suspect firms 
We take the standard approach in the literature to identify firms that have 
incentives to manage real activities to meet or beat important accounting thresholds. We 
label these firms “suspect” firms. We define firms that are suspected to have managed 
earnings as those that fall in the areas immediately right of zero, in the cross-sectional 
distribution of: (i) earnings before extraordinary items (SUSPECT), (ii) changes in 
earnings relative to the same quarter in the previous year (SUSPECT_Q4), and (iii) 
analysts’ forecast errors, defined as actual earnings minus analysts’ forecasts (MBE). The 
presumption is that in these areas of the cross-sectional distribution, there is a higher 
frequency of firms that have managed earnings, including firms that managed earnings 
through real activities (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev [1997]). Focusing on these specific 
firms enables us to increase the power of our tests. We classify suspect firms as those (i) 
whose quarterly earnings before extraordinary items (scaled by total assets) are between 0 
and 0.00125;8 (ii) whose seasonal quarterly change in earnings, compared to the same 
quarter in the previous year, is between 0 and 0.005; and (iii) who just met the consensus 
analysts’ forecast by one cent.  
                                                 
8 Since we use quarterly data we divide the top of the range defined in Roychowdhury [2006] of 0.005 by a 
scale of 4.  
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We emphasize that classifying firm-quarter observations into the “suspect” 
categories has its drawbacks. First, since this classification is based on ex-post 
realizations, we are likely to overlook some firms that managed earnings through varying 
their advertising activities but did not fall into the narrow range immediately to the right 
of the relevant yardstick. Second, the “suspect” range may contain firms whose pre-
managed earnings were well above the yardstick, leading them to create reserves for 
future periods by managing earnings in the opposite direction, i.e., downwards. This 
effect will tend to reduce the power of our tests, because firms that reduce and increase 
earnings are pooled together in the same “suspect” group. 
3.2 Modeling abnormal advertising activities  
To evaluate whether managers change advertising activities in response to 
accounting-based incentives to meet certain benchmarks, we employ a firm-specific time-
series model to isolate the abnormal portion of advertising expense. In this model, we use 
up to 60 months of advertising data. The model we employ follows Foster [1977], who 
models the time-series of quarterly earnings. The quarterly earnings expectation from the 
Foster model is: 
( ) 1 4 2 1 5* *( )t t t t tE Q Q Q Qθ θ ε− − −= + − +    (1), 
where Qt is earnings in quarter t, Qt-4 is an autoregressive term, and (Qt-1 – Qt-5) is a drift 
term. The Foster model assumes that earnings follow a first-order autoregressive process 
in seasonal differences. We adapt the Foster model to estimate a model for the monthly 
series of advertising outlays, as follows: 
( ) 1 12 2 1 13* *( )t t t t tE ADS ADS ADS ADSθ θ ε− − −= + − +   (2), 
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where ADSt is the monthly advertising outlay scaled by the annual sales during the prior 
year.  
  
4. Data 
4.1 Advertising data 
We obtain information about monthly advertising activities from a proprietary 
database constructed by a large media-tracking company. Our sample covers the years 
2001-2005. The data are gathered by continuously monitoring multiple media channels 
and collecting information about ad appearances. The media channels covered include (i) 
television (cable and network), (ii) print (newspapers, local magazines, consumer 
magazines and business magazines), (iii) radio (local and national), and (iv) internet.9 
The translation of media spots to monetary amounts is done by surveying media channels 
for their rates at various points during the quarter. The data set covers all media spending 
that appears in the tracked channels and is reported by the brand advertised. For example, 
the media spending by Johnson & Johnson is reported separately by its brands, which 
include Band-Aid, Tylenol, Neutrogena, etc. We aggregate the advertising outlays of all 
brands that belong to a particular sample firm. We emphasize that these data cover only 
media spending and do not include other forms of advertising, such as promotional 
materials and direct-response advertising (e.g., catalogs sent directly to consumers).  
4.2 Sample selection  
Table 1 reports the steps we took to construct our sample. To make sure that we 
include only firms that have substantial advertising budgets, we collect information about 
                                                 
9 See Appendix B for a detailed description of each media channel.  
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actual advertising activities and media spending information for firms whose average 
annual advertising expense over our sample period (2001-2005) exceeds $100,000. We 
perform this initial screen using the annual advertising expense figure in Compustat 
(data#45). Of those firms (2,312), we identify 1,542 firms that are covered in our 
proprietary database.  
The main data requirement is the ability to estimate abnormal advertising 
activities using the time-series model described in equation (2). This limits our sample to 
1,122 firms covering 33,841 monthly observations. Next, we separately construct three 
samples based on the variable we use to proxy for financial reporting incentives. As 
described in Table 1, after requiring sufficient data on some of the control variables, our 
samples cover between 755 and 1,076 firms, and the number of monthly observations 
varies from 18,098 to 30,143. 
4.3 Summary statistics  
Table 2 reports summary statistics for our sample firms. On average, our sample 
firms’ revenues are $3.8 billion, with a median of $438 million. As indicated by the 
difference between the mean and median, the sample is quite skewed with respect to size. 
Similar patterns emerge in total assets (mean of $4.7 billion and median of $435 million) 
and market capitalization (mean of $5.7 billion and median of $506 million). The average 
book-to-market ratio of firms in our sample is 0.76, with a median of 0.42.  
The average annual advertising expenses as reported in Compustat (data#45) for 
our sample firms is about $100 million, with a median of $9.1 million. Advertising 
expenses constitute about 4% of annual sales. Media-related advertising outlays tracked 
by the proprietary database we use are $44.5 million, on average, for the same set of 
firms. This suggests that media-related outlays constitute about half of advertising 
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expenses reported in the financial statements. The reason for the difference is that, as 
noted earlier, our database tracks only advertising activities related to media spending. It 
does not include other forms of advertising such as promotional materials and direct-
response advertising such as catalogs sent to consumers, which are included  as part of 
the advertising expense in Compustat. The correlation between the annual advertising 
expenses reported in Compustat and the annual media-related advertising is 0.85.  
 
5. Results 
5.1 Abnormal advertising activities 
We first report the results of estimating the time-series model of monthly 
advertising outlays as described in equation (2). The purpose of this model is to isolate 
the abnormal (discretionary) portion of advertising outlays. One advantage of modeling 
advertising outlays as an auto-regressive process is that it does not require a full 
specification of all potential determinants of the dependent variable. Instead, it assumes 
that the effect of changes in these determinants is captured in the lagged values of the 
dependent variable (i.e., advertising outlays), which are used as explanatory variables.  
An important feature of our research design is that the high-frequency monthly data we 
employ in our analyses enable us to estimate a firm-specific auto-regressive time-series 
model. Under this approach, the residuals one obtains are less likely to contain 
measurement errors that are correlated with omitted variables, unlike the residuals 
obtained from industry-based cross-sectional models used in prior studies.  
Table 3 reports the estimation results of equation (2). The table reports summary 
statistics of the model’s coefficients – θ1 and θ2 – for all 1,076 firm-specific models. The 
average number of months used in each firm-specific model is about 30. We observe that 
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monthly advertising media spending has a strong relation to the media spending in the 
same month of the prior year. The average of θ1 is about 0.80, and this coefficient is 
statistically significant in over 85% of the firm-specific models. There is also a moving-
average component (θ2), whose coefficient is 0.26 and is significant in over half of the 
models.  
 
5.2 Testing the hypotheses 
To test our hypotheses of managers’ altering advertising activities to attain their 
financial reporting objectives, we estimate variations of the following regression model: 
1 2 4_ * * *t tABN ADS INCENTIVE Y INCENTIVE Y Controlsα β β β ε= + + + + +  (4) 
In equation (4), the dependent variable, ABN_ADSt, is the residual obtained from 
firm-specific time-series models of monthly advertising spending described in the 
previous section. While this approach tries to minimize the measurement error in our 
dependent variable, as discussed in the previous section, it is certainly not free from such 
error. However, since this measurement error appears in our dependent variable, its only 
effect would be manifested in a lower R2. Clearly, this is not likely to bias the inferences 
we draw based on the reported results.  
INCENTIVE is an indicator variable that is a function of one of three financial 
reporting benchmarks: (i) SUSPECT is equal to one if a firm’s quarterly earnings before 
extraordinary items (scaled by total assets) are between 0 and 0.00125 (i.e., the bin just to 
the right of zero); (ii) SUSPECT_4Q is equal to one if a firm’s quarterly change in 
earnings, compared to the same quarter in the previous year, is between 0 and 0.005; and 
(iii) MBE is equal to one if a firm just met the consensus analysts’ forecast by one cent; 
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We interact the main incentive variables with several variables (Y’s) that test our 
hypotheses H2-H5. For hypothesis 2, we use an indicator variable (MONTH3) that is 
equal to one if the advertising spending occurred during the last month of a fiscal quarter. 
For hypothesis 3, we use an indicator variable (QTR4) that is equal to one if the 
advertising spending occurred during the fourth fiscal quarter. For hypothesis 4, we use 
two continuous variables — the natural logarithm of firm’s age (LNAGE) and the firm’s 
net margin (MARGIN). For hypothesis 5, we use an indicator variable (SOX) that is equal 
to one if the advertising spending occurred after 2003.  
Our control variables include SIZE – the market capitalization of the firm at the 
beginning of the fiscal year, INCOME – quarterly earning before extraordinary items 
deflated by beginning of the year’s assets, and BM – the book-to-market ratio at the 
beginning of the fiscal year.  
Hypotheses 1–3. Tables 4-6 report the results of estimating several versions of 
equation (4). The tables vary depending on the financial reporting benchmark that is 
being tested. To account for potential dependence among the monthly observations, we 
calculate the standard errors after clustering observations at the firm level (Petersen 
[2005]). Thus, all our statistical tests are based on clustered standard errors.  
Beginning with Table 4, where the financial reporting objective is to avoid 
reporting a loss (proxied by the SUSPECT variable), we find that in all specifications, the 
coefficient on SUSPECT is negative and highly significant (p-values of less than 0.01). 
This result is consistent with H1, which suggests that firms manage their advertising 
activities to report earnings that just meet the zero earnings benchmark. Moreover, the 
negative sign indicates that, on average, suspect firms choose to reduce advertising 
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activities. Recall that in the case of advertising spending, it is possible that firms would 
boost advertising activities in order to increase sales and earnings. However, our results 
indicate that, on average, this does not occur. The negative sign on SUSPECT is 
consistent with the findings in Roychowdhury [2006], who examines an aggregate 
variable of annual discretionary expenses that include research and development, general 
and administrative, and advertising expenses.  
A few points are worth mentioning. First, our results pertain to actual real 
activities taken by managers. This is possible due to the unique feature of our data that 
enables us to observe the actual ads that, according to GAAP, are supposed to be 
expensed as incurred. Past studies have employed expense-based measures of real 
activities, which are also subject to accrual manipulation (for example, aggressive 
capitalizations). Therefore, past results could be attributed to both real earnings 
management and accrual manipulations. Our advertising spending measures are not 
affected by accrual considerations and therefore can be directly attributed to real 
activities. Second, we utilize quarterly financial reporting benchmarks that, as reported in 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal [2005] and Brown and Caylor [2005], are perceived by 
managers to be more important than the annual benchmark used in Roychowdhury 
[2006]. Third, none of the studies in the literature (Gunny [2005], Roychowdhury [2006], 
Zang [2006]) has separately examined advertising activities. As such, our study provides 
a finer measure of a single activity as opposed to a coarser measure of multiple activities. 
Finally, our high-frequency data provide us with an opportunity for the most powerful 
setting for testing our hypotheses.  
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In addition to reporting the statistical significance of the results, we are also able 
to assess the economic significance of the findings pertaining to the SUSPECT variable. 
Specifically, the coefficient on SUSPECT indicates that suspect firms reduce their 
monthly advertising spending by 0.04% of annual sales, or the quarterly advertising 
spending by 0.12% of annual sales. The average annual sales in our sample is $3.8 
billion. This means that suspect firms reduce their quarterly advertising outlays by $4.6 
million. This reduction constitutes, on average, about 41.5% of quarterly media-related 
advertising expenses.  
Specification (3) in Table 4 reports the results when we add the MONTH3 
variable and the interaction term SUSPECT*MONTH3. The coefficient on MONTH3 is 
positive and significant. This means that, on average, firms increase their advertising 
outlays in the last month of the fiscal quarter. Examining the interaction term 
SUSPECT*MONTH3 sheds light on our second hypothesis. The coefficient on 
SUSPECT*MONTH3 is not significant. Thus, we do not find evidence that suspect firms 
are more likely to reduce their advertising activities in the third month of a fiscal quarter. 
This non-significant result can be interpreted in two alternative ways.  
First, it is possible that the lag between the decision to cut spending and the actual 
reduction in spending is not short enough to enable firms to adjust their advertising 
spending in the last month of a fiscal quarter. Recall that firms would like to postpone 
cutting spending to a time when information about expected quarterly performance is 
more accurate. Thus, any decision to cut advertising activities to meet earning 
benchmarks occurs before the third month of the fiscal quarter. This is also consistent 
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with Zang [2006], who argues that decisions about real activities occur earlier in the 
fiscal period, and before any accrual manipulations.  
The second interpretation assumes that altering of real activities can only occur 
late in the quarter because managers need to learn about the firm’s ongoing performance 
in order to know how much to alter real activities. This assumption, of course, is feasible 
only in activities that are quick to alter, such as advertising. Under this assumption, the 
reduction in quarterly advertising activities is not a response to accounting incentives to 
meet certain benchmarks, but rather a reaction to some unobserved changes in economic 
conditions. One advantage of our high-frequency setting is that it provides us an 
opportunity to explore this alternative interpretation in a powerful way with monthly 
data. We believe that our setting is powerful enough to find an effect in the third month, 
for two reasons. First, unlike previous studies that pool together several types of 
discretionary operating expenses, our focus on a single item increases the likelihood that 
our model is well specified. Second, our use of a long firm-specific time-series of 
advertising spending further enhances our confidence in the model, which attempts to 
separate normal and abnormal advertising activities.  
The rightmost column in Table 4 reports the results of estimating equation (4) 
including the indicator variable QTR4, which equals to one if the observation’s fiscal 
quarter is the fourth quarter. In addition, we include the interaction term 
SUSPECT*QTR4 to examine whether the general effect of SUSPECT is different during 
the fourth quarter. The coefficients on both of these variables are insignificant. This 
suggests that the general effect of suspect firms to reduce advertising spending is not 
different in the fourth quarter. This result is consistent with firms not using incremental 
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manipulation of real activities in the fourth quarter because of their lack of ability to alter 
these actions late in the fiscal year (Zang [2006]). However, since we believe that 
advertising spending is among the real activities with the shortest lag between decision 
and execution, our interpretation suggests that the documented reductions, which do not 
vary by incentives, may not be due to manipulations of real activities.10 
Finally, the only control variable to load significantly is SIZE. Its negative sign 
suggests that larger firms are more likely to have lower abnormal advertising activities. 
The sign on market capitalization is different than that reported in prior studies (e.g., 
Roychowdhury [2006]. Note, however, that the dependent variable is also different 
because it only captures a subset of the expenses measured in Roychowdhury [2006].  
Table 5 reports the estimation results of similar models to those reported in Table 
4. The difference is that the incentive variable, SUSPECT_4Q, is defined based on the 
changes in earnings before extraordinary items relative to the same quarter in the 
previous year. The results in Table 5 are similar to those reported in Table 4. First, the 
coefficient on SUSPECT_4Q is consistently negative and significant. Second, there is 
weak evidence of higher abnormal advertising spending during the third month of the 
fiscal quarter, as the coefficient of MONTH3 is marginally significant (p-value of 0.09). 
There is no evidence of incremental abnormal advertising spending by suspect firms 
during the third month of the fiscal quarter, as the coefficient on the interaction term 
                                                 
10 In untabulated results, we assess the impact of changes in real economic conditions on altering 
discretionary advertising spending by including the percentage change in seasonally adjusted Gross 
Domestic Products over the previous quarter in our regression models, as an additional explanatory 
variable. This variable is insignificant, and the variable SUSPECT remains negative and strongly 
significant. This leads us to conclude that the variable SUSPECT does not merely capture response to 
changes in economic conditions, at least as they are captured by changes in GDP.  
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SUSPECT_4Q*MONTH3 is not significantly different from zero. In addition, we do not 
find evidence of abnormal advertising spending in the fourth fiscal quarter.  
In Table 6, we report results of the third proxy for meeting financial reporting 
goals, MBE, which uses analysts’ forecasts as the benchmark. MBE is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one if the firm’s earnings per share for the quarter met the 
last outstanding analyst consensus forecast by one cent per share or less. Notice, first, that 
the number of observations declines to about 18,000, and the number of firms decreases 
to about 760. This reduction is due to additional data requirements imposed by IBES 
coverage. The coefficient on the main incentive variable, MBE, is negative in most 
specifications, similar to the previous tables. However, the statistical significance of the 
evidence is slightly weaker. This could be due to the fact that when trying to meet 
analysts’ forecasts, managers do not know exactly what the target should be, as analysts 
keep updating their quarterly forecasts throughout the fiscal period. In other words, the 
benchmark that managers try to beat is a moving target, and is perhaps harder to achieve 
through the manipulation of advertising spending.  
As for QTR4, we find that abnormal advertising spending is higher in the fourth 
quarter (p-value of 0.009 on QTR4). We also find that the entire significant effect of 
meeting analysts’ forecasts through advertising spending is attributed to the fourth fiscal 
quarter. Notice that MBE turns insignificant while the interaction term MBE*QTR4 is 
highly significant. This suggests that with respect to analysts’ forecasts, managers are 
able to reduce advertising spending only for the final quarter of the year. This could be 
consistent with managers learning throughout the year and, thus, having better 
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information about analysts’ fourth-quarter forecasts as well as about the firm’s actual 
annual financial performance.  
Hypothesis 4. Recall that in our fourth hypothesis we raised the possibility that 
managers may either decrease or increase advertising activities to achieve certain 
earnings benchmarks. This depends on the length of the lead-lag relationship between 
advertising activities and their sales response. It also depends on firms’ net margins. In 
Table 7, we use two different variables to test this hypothesis. In the first column, we 
include the natural log of firms’ age to proxy for the elasticity between advertising and 
sales. It is argued that younger firms will tend to have a higher elasticity of advertising-
to-sales than older firms. Therefore, any increase in advertising activities in younger 
firms will translate into larger increases in sales than in older firms. We find that older 
firms tend to have lower abnormal advertising spending, as reflected in the negative 
coefficient on LNAGE. Our main interest lies in the interaction term SUSPECT*LNAGE. 
Its coefficient is positive (0.0004) and highly significant. This suggests that older suspect 
firms (and not younger) tend to increase advertising activities to avoid reporting losses. 
We do not find evidence that such an increase occurs in the third month of the fiscal 
period. This result is contrary to the expectation that younger firms will tend to increase 
advertising because of the higher elasticity of their advertising activities.  
The second column in Table 7 examines the association of net margin with the 
change in advertising activities. Firms with higher net margins are more likely to increase 
sales through increased advertising activities, because any increase in sales will translate 
into an increase in earnings, over and above the increase in advertising expenses. We find 
no evidence that the general trend suggests an increase in advertising activities for 
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suspect firms with higher net margins (SUSPECT*MARGIN is insignificant). However, 
we find evidence that suspect firms with high margins increase their advertising activities 
in the third month of the fiscal quarter. The coefficient on the interaction term 
SUSPECT*MARGIN*MONTH3 is positive (0.0258) and significant (p-value of 0.023). In 
untabulated results we include both age and margin. The results are similar to those 
reported for the separate models. 
Hypothesis 5. In our final hypothesis we examine whether there is an increase in 
the tendency of managers to engage in real earnings management in the form of altering 
advertising activities to meet certain benchmarks following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
According to Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal [2005], managers’ preferences for using 
real- versus accrual-based strategies may have changed after the new legislation. Table 8 
reports results of our basic model, including an indicator variable, SOX, that equals to one 
in the years 2003-2005. The coefficient on SUSPECT*SOX is insignificant. Thus, we find 
no evidence of an increased likelihood of using advertising activities to avoid reporting 
losses in the post-SOX period.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we study whether managers alter their advertising spending to 
achieve financial reporting objectives, such as avoiding reporting a loss, avoiding 
reporting a decrease in earnings, and meeting analysts’ consensus forecasts. We do so by 
utilizing a unique and comprehensive data set of monthly advertising spending in media 
outlets. This data set enables us to directly analyze actual real managerial activities that, 
according to GAAP, should be expensed as incurred. This is in contrast to examining 
reported expenses, which are also subject to accrual manipulations. Therefore, our 
  
31
 
approach is different than the one used in prior studies in which reported expenses serve 
as an indirect proxy for inferring real earnings management. Our data on advertising 
activities also allow us to focus on a specific item that is subject to managerial discretion 
as opposed to an aggregate proxy of several discretionary expenses activities. Finally, the 
high-frequency feature of our data set provides us with a powerful setting to investigate 
the incentives to meet quarterly earnings benchmarks as well as to examine the timing of 
real activities’ manipulations.  
We find strong evidence that firms reduce their advertising spending in order to 
meet all three types of financial reporting objectives we examine. We find weaker 
evidence of an increase in abnormal advertising activities in the third month of a fiscal 
quarter. However, this increase is not limited to “suspect” firms, i.e., firms that have just 
achieved the three financial reporting objectives. One exception is that we do find 
evidence of increased advertising activities to meet analysts’ forecasts during the third 
month of the fiscal quarter. Finally, we uncover circumstances in which firms have 
incentives to increase advertising spending to avoid reporting a loss. Specifically, firms 
with higher net margins are associated with higher abnormal advertising spending in the 
third month of the fiscal quarter.  
Overall, this study contributes to the emerging literature on real earnings 
management activities. The evidence we provide enhances our understanding of the 
interplay between managers’ incentives and the real actions managers take to achieve 
financial reporting goals.  
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Appendix A 
Our database records advertising activities at the time they appear in a media outlet (e.g., 
when they are aired on television or appear in print). According to Statement of Position 
(SOP) 93-7: Reporting on Advertising Costs, firms are required to expense advertising 
activities as they are incurred.  Thus, if firms follow GAAP, our database will include all 
media-related advertising that should have been expensed in the period in which they 
were aired or printed.  
The following paragraphs from SOP 93-7 describe the accounting treatment in detail: 
Paragraph 26 
The costs of advertising should be expensed either as incurred or the first time the 
advertising takes place… except for-- 
a. Direct-response advertising (1) whose primary purpose is to elicit sales to 
customers who could be shown to have responded specifically to the advertising 
and (2) that results in probable future economic benefits.  
 
b.  Expenditures for advertising costs that are made subsequent to recognizing 
revenues related to those costs 
 
Paragraph 42 
Advertising activities may have several component costs. Two primary components, 
which are made up of other components, are the costs of (a) producing advertisements, 
such as the costs of idea development, writing advertising copy, artwork, printing, audio 
and video crews, actors, and other costs, and (b) communicating advertisements that 
have been produced, such as the costs of magazine space, television airtime, billboard 
space, and distribution (postage stamps, for example). 
 
Paragraph 43 
Costs of producing advertising are incurred during production rather than when the 
advertising takes place. 
 
Paragraph 44 
Costs of communicating advertising are not incurred until the item or service has been 
received and should not be reported as expenses before the item or service has been 
received… For example-- 
• The costs of television airtime should not be reported as advertising expense 
before the airtime is used. Once it is used, the costs should be expensed, unless 
the airtime was used for direct-response advertising activities that meet the 
criteria for capitalization under this SOP.  
• The costs of magazine, directory, or other print media advertising space should 
not be reported as advertising expense before the space is used. Once it is used, 
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the costs should be expensed, unless the space was used for direct-response 
advertising activities that meet the criteria for capitalization under this SOP. 
 
Our database contains only media-related advertising that cannot be treated as direct-
response advertising and therefore has to be expensed in the period of appearance.  
Suppose that an advertisement appeared on television on January 15, 2007. This 
advertisement will be captured in our database. If the firm follows GAAP, the 
advertisement will appear as an expense in the financial statements for the quarter ending 
on March 31, 2007. Thus, our database captures all media-related advertising activities 
during the period that are supposed to be expensed in the income statement.  
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Appendix B 
This appendix describes the various media outlets from which the advertising data are 
collected. 
1. Television 
Cable Television: Commercial occurrences and advertising activities information for 
52 cable television networks. Cable television is monitored via satellite 24 hours a 
day, 365 days a year. 
Spot Television: Commercial occurrence and expenditure information for more than 
600 English-speaking stations and 35 Spanish-speaking stations in 100 major 
markets. Spot television is monitored 21 hours a day (5 a.m. to 2 a.m.). The 
monitored stations constitute the principal stations in each market and typically 
include the network affiliates, major independents, and Spanish affiliates. Public 
broadcasting stations are not monitored. 
Network Television: Commercial occurrence and expenditure information for seven 
broadcast networks: ABC, CBS, FOX, NBC, PAX/I, MNTV, and CW.  
2. Print 
Magazines: All paid advertising space and expenditure data in over 350 consumer 
magazines and over 30 local magazines.  
Newspapers: All advertising space in over 250 daily and Sunday newspaper editions 
and Sunday magazines, including national newspapers such as The New York Times, 
USA Today, and Wall Street Journal. In national newspapers, all national and 
regional editions are measured. 
3. Radio 
Local Radio: Data are based on the tracking of radio billings by stations in more than 
100 radio markets. 
National Spot Radio: Nationally placed spot radio data for approximately 4,000 
stations in more than 225 markets. Reported expenditures are based on audited 
billings from contract information provided by the following major national station 
representative organizations: ABC, Allied, Christal, Clear Channel, Cumulus, D&R, 
Infinity, Katz, KHM, Lotus, and McGavren.  
4. Internet 
Advertising expenditure information is measured for over 2,500 sites and 90,000 
brands in the United States and Canada. A proprietary spider probes the sites on an 
ongoing basis and captures and stores every image on a page.  
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Table 1. Sample construction. This table describes the sample construction procedure. 
Each of our three samples is based on the same information on monthly advertising 
activities. The monthly advertising outlays are drawn from a proprietary database and are 
for the period 2001-2005. The samples differ on the type of financial reporting 
benchmark hypothesized to affect managers’ incentives to alter their advertising 
activities.  
 Number 
of firms  
Number of 
monthly 
observations 
Firms with material advertising expense 2,312 — 
Firms covered in the proprietary database 1,542 — 
Firms and observations with sufficient information to 
compute abnormal advertising measures  
1,122 33,841 
   
Sample 1   
Observations with sufficient information to calculate 
the SUSPECT variable, based on quarterly income 
1,122 33,013 
Observations with sufficient information to calculate 
SIZE, INCOME, and BM 
1,076 30,143 
   
Sample 2   
Observations with sufficient information to calculate 
the SUSPECT_4Q variable, based on change in 
income relative to the same quarter in the prior year 
1,026 29,598 
Observations with sufficient information to calculate 
SIZE, INCOME, and BM 
986 27,696 
   
Sample 3   
Observations with sufficient information to calculate 
the MBE variable, based on analysts’ forecast errors 
765 18,503 
Observations with sufficient information to calculate 
SIZE, INCOME, and BM 
755 18,098 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for sample firms. This table reports summary statistics 
for our final sample of 1,076 firms. The numbers reported are the summary of the firm-
average across the five sample years. Sales is defined as the annual figure of total sales in 
million of dollars from Compustat (data#12). Assets is defined as total assets from 
Compustat (data#6). BM is the book-to-market ratio. Advertising expenses is the annual 
advertising expense from Compustat (data#45). Advertising outlays is the annual sum of 
all monthly media-related advertising outlays tracked by our proprietary database.  
 
 Mean Median Std 25% 75% 
Sales (Mil $) 3,848 438.3 14,569 118.3 1,654.1 
Assets (Mil $) 4,743 435.2 21,314 122.4 1,699 
Market capitalization (Mil $) 5,695 506.2 22,902 136.0 2,034.3 
BM   0.76 0.42 4.01 0.24 0.70 
Advertising expenses (Mil $)  100.2 9.1 360.6 1.7 42.2 
Ad expenses/Sales 4.03% 1.94% 8.06% 0.88% 4.61% 
Advertising outlays (Mil $) 44.5 1.76 187.3 0.25 13.1 
Ad outlays/Sales 2.35% 0.49% 8.95% 0.11% 1.81% 
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Table 3. Results of time-series models of monthly advertising expenditures. This 
table reports summary statistics of coefficients from estimating a firm-specific time-series 
model of monthly advertising expenditures. The average (median) number of 
observations per firm is 30.5 (17.4). The model is an adaptation of the Foster [1977] 
model for quarterly earnings:  
 
( ) 1 12 2 1 13* *( )t t t t tE ADS ADS ADS ADSθ θ ε− − −= + − +  
 
 
 
 Θ1 Θ2 
N 1,077 1,077 
Mean 0.7932 0.2640 
Standard deviation 0.6071 0.3154 
   
10% 0.2753 -0.0900 
25% 0.5692 0.0254 
Median 0.7999 0.2563 
75% 0.9488 0.4849 
90% 1.047 0.6568 
% significant (5%) 86.8 51.2 
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Table 4. Tests of real earnings management based on monthly advertising activities. 
The table reports estimation results of models whose dependent variable is monthly 
abnormal advertising expenditures. These are calculated based on the residuals from 
firm-specific time-series models estimated up to 60 months (an average of 30 months). 
SUSPECT is an indicator variable equal to one if quarterly income before extraordinary 
items deflated by total assets is above 0 and less than 0.0125%. MONTH3 is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the month is the third month of a fiscal quarter. QTR4 is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the quarter is the fourth fiscal quarter. INCOME is 
income before extraordinary items deflated by total assets at the beginning of the year; 
BM is the book-to-market ratio. SIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalization. P-
values in parentheses are based on robust firm-clustered standard errors (e.g., Rogers 
[1993], Petersen [2005]). ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
INTERCEPT 0.0004 0.0014 0.0013 0.0014 
 (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
SUSPECT -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 
 (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
MONTH3   0.0001  
   (0.021)**  
SUSPECT*MONTH3   -0.0001  
   (0.890)  
QTR4    0.0001 
    (0.417) 
SUSPECT*QTR4    0.0001 
    (0.591) 
SIZE  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
  (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** 
INCOME  -0.007 -0.0071 -0.0071 
  (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) 
BM  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
  (0.291) (0.291) (0.292) 
     
Observations 33,013 30,143 30,143 30,143 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0000 0.0048 0.0048 0.0048 
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Table 5. Tests of real earnings management based on monthly advertising 
expenditures. The table reports estimation results of models whose dependent variable is 
monthly abnormal advertising expenditures. These are calculated based on the residuals 
from firm-specific time-series models estimated up to 60 months (an average of 30 
months). SUSPECT_4Q is an indicator variable equal to one if the changes in quarterly 
income before extraordinary items deflated by total assets is above 0 and less than 0.05%. 
MONTH3 is an indicator variable equal to one if the month is the third month of a fiscal 
quarter. QTR4 is an indicator variable equal to one if the quarter is the fourth fiscal 
quarter. INCOME is income before extraordinary items deflated by assets at the 
beginning of the year; BM is the book-to-market ratio. SIZE is the natural logarithm of 
market capitalization. P-values in parentheses are based on robust firm-clustered standard 
errors (e.g., Rogers [1993], Petersen [2005]). ***, **, and * signify significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
INTERCEPT 0.0005 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 
 (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
SUSPECT_4Q -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0003 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** 
MONTH3   0.0001  
   (0.090)*  
SUSPECT_4Q*MONTH3   -0.0001  
   (0.410)  
QTR4    0.0000 
    (0.900) 
SUSPECT_4Q*QTR4    0.0000 
    (0.778) 
SIZE  -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
  (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** 
INCOME  -0.0080 -0.0080 -0.0080 
  (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) 
BM  -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 
  (0.012)** (0.012)** (0.012)** 
     
Observations 29,598 27,696 27,696 27,696 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0005 0.0066 0.0066 0.0066 
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Table 6. Tests of real earnings management based on monthly advertising activities. 
The table reports estimation results of models whose dependent variable is monthly 
abnormal advertising expenditures. These are calculated based on the residuals from 
firm-specific time-series models estimated up to 60 months (an average of 30 months). 
MBE is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm’s earnings per share 
for the quarter met the last outstanding analyst consensus forecast by one cent per share 
or less. MONTH3 is an indicator variable equal to one if the month is the third month of 
a fiscal quarter. QTR4 is an indicator variable equal to one if the quarter is the fourth 
fiscal quarter. INCOME is income before extraordinary items deflated by assets at the 
beginning of the year; BM is the book-to-market ratio. SIZE is the natural logarithm of 
market capitalization. P-values in parentheses are based on robust firm-clustered standard 
errors (e.g., Rogers [1993], Petersen [2005]). ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
INTERCEPT 0.0003 0.0015 0.0015 0.0011 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
MBE -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 
 (0.065)* (0.075)* (0.014)** (0.642) 
MONTH3   -0.0001  
   (0.900)  
MBE*MONTH3   0.0001  
   (0.061)*  
QTR4    0.0001 
    (0.009)*** 
MBE*QTR4    -0.0002 
    (0.001)*** 
SIZE  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
INCOME  -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0001 
  (0.491) (0.492) (0.885) 
BM  -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0003 
  (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** 
     
Observations 18,503 18,098 18,098 18,098 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0001 0.0047 0.0048 0.0099 
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Table 7. Tests of real earnings management based on monthly advertising 
expenditures. The table reports estimation results of models whose dependent variable is 
monthly abnormal advertising expenditures. These are calculated based on the residuals 
from firm-specific time-series models estimated up to 60 months (an average of 30 
months). The analysis is conducted on a limited number of observations that are closest 
to the area of zero earnings. Specifically, we use observations whose earnings before 
extraordinary items deflated by total assets is between -0.0075 and 0.00625. SUSPECT is 
an indicator variable equal to one if quarterly income before extraordinary items deflated 
by total assets is above 0 and less than 0.0125%. MONTH3 is an indicator variable equal 
to one if the month is the third month of a fiscal quarter. QTR4 is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the quarter is the fourth fiscal quarter. INCOME is income before 
extraordinary items deflated by assets at the beginning of the year; BM is the book-to-
market ratio. SIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalization. P-values in 
parentheses are based on robust firm-clustered standard errors (e.g., Rogers [1993], 
Petersen [2005]). ***, **, and * signify significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  
 
 X= 
LNAGE 
X= 
MARGIN 
INTERCEPT 0.0019 
(0.000)*** 
 
0.0013 
(0.001)*** 
SUSPECT -0.0014 
(0.002)*** 
 
-0.0004 
(0.006)*** 
MONTH3 0.0001 
(0.022)*** 
 
0.0001 
(0.018)*** 
SUSPECT*MONTH3 -0.0002 
(0.700) 
 
-0.0001 
(0.296) 
X -0.0003 
(0.001)*** 
 
-0.0001 
(0.427) 
SUSPECT*X 0.0004 
(0.010)*** 
 
-0.0068 
(0.641) 
SUSPECT* X* MONTH3 0.0001 
(0.733) 
 
0.0258 
(0.023)*** 
SIZE -0.0001 
(0.060)** 
 
-0.0001 
(0.011)** 
INCOME -0.0073 
(0.118) 
 
-0.0066 
(0.124) 
BM -0.0001 
(0.349) 
-0.0001 
(0.291) 
   
Observations 29,561 30,124 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0060 0.0054 
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Table 8. Tests of real earnings management based on monthly advertising 
expenditures following SOX. The table reports estimation results of models whose 
dependent variable is monthly abnormal advertising expenditures. These are calculated 
based on the residuals from firm-specific time-series models estimated up to 60 months 
(an average of 30 months). SUSPECT is an indicator variable equal to one if quarterly 
income before extraordinary items deflated by total assets is above 0 and less than 
0.0125%. SOX is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the observation is in 
2003 and onward and 0 otherwise. INCOME is income before extraordinary items 
deflated by assets at the beginning of the year; BM is the book-to-market ratio. SIZE is 
the natural logarithm of market capitalization. P-values in parentheses are based on 
robust firm-clustered standard errors (e.g., Rogers [1993], Petersen [2005]). ***, **, and 
* signify significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  
 
  
INTERCEPT 0.0014 
 (0.001)*** 
SUSPECT -0.0004 
 (0.029)** 
SOX -0.0001 
 (0.539) 
SOX*SUSPECT -0.0000 
 (0.890) 
SIZE -0.0001 
 (0.010)*** 
INCOME -0.0071 
 (0.124) 
BM -0.0001 
 (0.293) 
  
Observations 30,143 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0048 
 
